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COMPONENTS OF NATIONAL IDENTITIES  
– A COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
Mladen lazić,  JelenaPešić1
ABSTRACT The article presents the results of an analysis of attitudes towards 
the importance of components of national identity – cultural, ascriptive and civic – 
based on data collected from a survey conducted in seventeen European countries. 
Differences in identity formation between countries with specific historical legacies 
(democratic traditions, dominant religious denomination, and ethnic composition) 
and structural characteristics (GDP per capita, level of urbanization, migration rate, 
and tertiary education attainment rate) are analysed, as well as the significance of 
different individual predictors (gender, age and university education). The main 
hypothesis, that modernization processes influence the strengthening of the civic 
component, as well as the weakening of ascriptive and cultural components, was 
confirmed. However, the results suggest that the modernizing effects of the exam-
ined factors (economic, cultural and political) are visible only up to a certain level of 
development, whereupon they tend to decrease their influence. The strongest influ-
ence on the strength of civic components is recorded for an economic factor – GDP 
per capita. Although civic components proved to be dominant in shaping the national 
identities across the examined countries, the other two traits – ascriptive and cultural 
– do not disappear, testifying to the still hybrid nature of national identity.
KEYWORDS National identity, ascriptive/cultural/civic basis, modernization, 
comparative research
CONCEPTS
The paper is based on two general presuppositions: one concerns the compo-
nents of national identity, and the other the historical conditions governing its 
formation and subsequent changes (for more, see Smith, 1991, 2009; obviously, 
Smiths’ third thesis on the fruitfulness in research of the concept of identity 
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is also accepted; for an opposing view see Malešević, 2006, 2011). Smith has 
clearly derived the characteristics of national identity from the nature of a na-
tion’s constitution: a territorial type of nation is the basis of civic identity, while 
demotic identity is built on the ethnic type of nation (Smith, 2009: 41-60). 
Demotic identity includes ascriptive and cultural components (ethnic origin, 
language, collective memories, myths, etc.; their common denominator is the 
fact that they are substantively and exclusively defined), while civic identity is 
based on citizenship, respect for laws, political participation, etc. (traits which 
are formally defined and therefore accessible to everyone). Incidentally, if the 
starting historical conditions of nation formation (bureaucratic incorporation 
versus vernacular mobilization) fundamentally differ, in time – especially in 
consequence of modernization factors (strengthening of the nation-state, in-
cluding the development of state administration, an army, educational system, 
mass communications, etc., together with the rise of a capitalist market econo-
my) –, the ‘original’ basis of identity will change towards favouring the spread-
ing and fostering of civic components. Namely, nations ‘fixed’ in territorial 
frames of nation-states for a longer period of time (irrespective of the way 
they were constituted) are increasingly subject to the logic of the reproduction 
of state apparatuses (as well as of a universalizing market economy) which 
reinforces exactly those components of identity that secure the unobstructed 
functioning of reproduction. These are essentially civic components, or trans-
formed cultural components (primarily language, which, having become ‘of-
ficial’, simultaneously acquires the characteristics of formal and substantive 
components).
However, we must, still, bear in mind that certain cultural components of 
identity belong to longue durée historical phenomena (the idea of a com-
mon ethnic origin), while some others are taken over and sustained by the 
state (although on a modified basis – e.g. language). The result of this dual 
process is the following: national identity in contemporary nation-states 
appears as a differing – and changeable – mixture of these components 
(Smith, 2009).
We must note that the bulk of research into the characteristics of nations and 
national identities has been based on theoretical-historical arguments (developed 
in the framework of individual nation-states or comparative research), as was 
the case with the work of Smith, Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm (1990), etc., or on 
micro-sociological research with a nominalist hypothesis that national identity 
is a phenomenon of solely (or primarily) individual consciousness and action 
(Brubaker, 2004; Bonikowski, 2013). Our argument in this paper is empirically 
based and draws on survey data collected during the implementation of a ma-
jor comparative research project – which means that we accept yet another of 
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Smiths’ theses: that understanding the nation as a “real community” is theoreti-
cally legitimate (see Smith, 2009: 13-14).2
We assume that the concept of national identity signifies the feeling common 
to a number of individuals that they permanently belong to a national group 
because of specific and distinct traits they share with its other members which 
simultaneously differentiate them from other national/ethnic groups (see e.g. 
Wesolowski, Slomczynski and Dubrow, 2010). The origin of this feeling rests 
outside the individual, in the group he/she identifies with. Its source is the 
need of the national group to remain stable in relation to other groups, self-de-
fined in the same way according to corresponding criteria. In order to fulfil 
this need, the group adopts (or, according to another and different theoretical 
paradigm: constructs – see Anderson, 1991) certain characteristics to repre-
sent specific ‘values’ common to all its members, which distinguish them from 
members of another group or groups, who signify ‘others’, different and poten-
tially confronted with ‘us’. Differentiation and potential confrontation are the 
necessary elements of identity, which is essentially a relational concept (see 
e.g. Devereux, 1978).
The analysis that follows rests on the assumption that modernization process-
es (accompanied by the strengthening of liberal national states) simultaneously 
took place with a rise in the importance of civic components of national iden-
tity and a decline in the significance of cultural and ascriptive components. As 
for modernization, we must note the profusion of literature about this historical 
process which renders any attempt to comment on it here meaningless. We will 
instead simply state our understanding of this concept. Briefly, and descriptive-
ly, modernization has been a multidimensional process, which includes social 
differentiation (Smelser, 1959, 1967), creation of a mass consumption society 
(Rostow, 1960) – implying a universal market economy of an industrial, and, 
later on, post-industrial type (with a tendency to permanent growth, an increase 
in urbanization, dramatically accelerated communication, etc.), a political sys-
tem organized on the basis of liberal democracy (Apter, 1965; Eisenstatd, 1966; 
Weinberg, 1976), and the spread of ‘modern values’ (including secularism, indi-
vidualism, trust in science, achievement orientation, protection of human rights, 
etc.; Inkeles and Smith, 1974; see also Lerner, 1958; McClelland, 1967; Inglehart 
1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Dalton, 2004; Dalton & Shin, 2006; Klinge-
mann, 1999; Norris, 1999).3
2  It has to be said that similar differentiation between primordial, civic and cultural codes in con-
structing collective (and especially ethnic) boundaries and identities can be found in Eisentstadt and 
Giessen’s programmatic text on the construction of collective identities (Eisenstadt & Giessen, 1995).
3  We cite ‘classic’ authors since it is clear that neo-modernization critique has not fundamentally questioned 
most of the key elements of the theory enumerated above (see Alexander and Sztompka, eds., 1992).
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The advancement of these processes in recent decades has additionally changed 
the institutional preconditions of the formation of national identities. Suffice 
it to recall here the changes that underwent nation-states in Europe due to the 
strengthening of economic, political and cultural linkages within the EU: eco-
nomic growth leading to an increase in mutual economic-political dependence, 
a high level of migration, and cultural permeation. With the creation of suprana-
tional institutions (government, parliament, courts, a central bank, etc.), together 
with the gradual devaluation of interstate borders, common currency, symbolic 
elements like flags and anthems, etc., many characteristics of nation-states ‘dou-
ble’ as (potential) bases of new identities. The concept of the “other” as a neces-
sary counterpoint in view of the relational character of identity (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979)  has therefore been defined to a greater extent at two levels: national and 
European (or very often, even broader: Western, Christian, etc.). In other words, 
the identity basis appears at several levels: not only as regional and national (as 
before) but also as European, etc. It is increasingly difficult to define this ‘extend-
ed’ basis of identity ascriptively, and in many cases even using cultural factors. 
HYPOTHETICAL FRAMEWORK
We do not discuss our first analytical hypothesis – based on the three compo-
nents of national identity: ascriptive, cultural and civic – simply because it was 
built into the data collection instrument used in the survey. We only propose the 
view that ascriptive and cultural components are (or at least originally, were) very 
close due to their being defined in a substantive way, and taken to be ‘inherent’ to 
the members of a nation; exclusive, unchangeable (or difficult to change), and there-
fore characteristic of the demotic type of identity. Conversely, civic components 
are fundamentally different, being susceptible to universal acquisition (potentially 
inclusive) and change, and are characteristic of the civic type of identity. 
As already mentioned, the result of the historical processes of nation-state for-
mation lead us to assume that all three components of national identity were widely 
present in all the countries researched, meaning that national identity is hybrid, and 
that, at this level, differences between members of different nations may be found 
only to the extent that individual components of identity are present. At this point, 
the following research problem arises: which factors account for the variation in 
the spread of particular components? We thus firstly examine the hypothesis on 
modernization; a phenomenon which creates contextual conditions relevant for the 
formation of identity, different in different nation states. 
If the starting historical conditions for nation and identity formations were dif-
ferent, historical processes in the 19th and 20th centuries, modernization above 
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all gradually reduced these differences and significantly equalized the political, 
economic and cultural conditions for national identity reproduction (in European 
states, which are the locus of our research). A single piece of sociological research 
clearly cannot analyze too many factors which might influence the remaking of 
the components which constitute identity, but one can try to single out some of the 
factors ‘representative’ of the basic subsystems – economic, political and cultural – 
wherein modernization unfolds, and investigate if, and to what extent, these factors 
have been relevant for the presence of different identity components.
In order to check these hypotheses we operationalized the basic processes of 
modernization. Economic modernization is summed up by two indicators: level 
of economic development (expressed by GDP per capita), and level of urbani-
zation (indicated by the percentage of urban dwellers in the total population). 
We do not find an extended explanation of this choice to be necessary. Namely, 
from its emergence the theory of modernization took economic development to 
be the goal of social progress, and simultaneously its indicator, and more or less 
the same is true of urbanization. In view of this, we posit the hypothesis that a 
higher level of GDP per capita and of urbanization are positively correlated with 
indicators of civic identity, and negatively with ascriptive identity, while the rela-
tionship with cultural components is less certain, because all indicators of these 
components represent phenomena of long historical duration (ethnicity, religion, 
or/and tradition).
The choice of political modernization indicators is also simple on the conceptual 
level. We selected the duration of a democratic political regime in a country. The 
explanation is quite obvious: the establishment and stability of a liberal-democratic 
regime, by definition, represents one of the basic forms of modernization. Briefly, 
our hypothesis is that the duration of a democratic political order in nation-states 
positively correlates with civic components of identity, and negatively with the as-
criptive ones, while in the case of cultural components the above conclusion (an 
uncertain outcome) also applies.
As for cultural modernization, we first check one simple indicator: the percent-
age of the population with a university degree in a country. It is well known that 
the proportion of highly educated people is directly related to the level of modern-
ization. The hypothesis that follows is that a higher percentage of the population 
with a university degree is positively related to civic components and negatively 
to ascriptive ones, with – once again – uncertain results in the case of cultural 
components.
We also check how modernization relates to another factor in the cultural sphere: 
religion, expressed in two of its manifestations: intensity of religious practice as 
indicated by the rate of regular church attendance, and majority denomination. 
It is very well known that a decrease in the spread of religiosity (secularization) 
32
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2016)
has been described as an important element of modern social development by the 
‘founding fathers’ of sociology (Marx, Weber, and Durkheim). Despite all con-
troversies following this thesis (including the notorious exception of the USA, the 
spread of religious fundamentalism and new forms of secular religion and the re-
ligious revival in post-communist countries in eastern Europe, etc.), it has still re-
ceived wide theoretical and empirical support (see e.g. Norris and Inglehart, 2004). 
Our hypothesis, therefore, will be that a lower proportion of regular churchgoers is 
positively correlated with the spread of civic components and negatively with the 
spread of the other two traits.
The connection between religious denomination and modernization may be 
demonstrated in different ways. A direct connection was stressed by Hunting-
ton, who claimed that cultural patterns based primarily on religion supported 
unequally the democratization of a political system, and consequently, moderni-
zation: Protestantism stimulates democratization and Catholicism much less so, 
while Orthodoxy hinders democracy (Huntington, 1976, 1996). While this thesis 
has (rightly) been criticized for being highly politicized, our hypothesis might be 
supported in another way. Namely, it may also be demonstrated that the impor-
tance of Orthodox churches in maintaining the integrity of ethnic communities 
in earlier times (of Muslim political domination), and their association with na-
tion-states later on, created a preference for ascriptive and cultural components 
of identity, which is consistent with our previous arguments. Briefly, we may pro-
pose the hypothesis that Protestantism as the dominant denomination is positive-
ly associated with civic components, and the prevailing Orthodox denomination 
with ascriptive and cultural ones, which leaves the predominantly Catholic states 
somewhere in between.
Finally, we believe that it is not necessary to prove that the ethnic composition 
of a population is connected with characteristics of national identity. Presumably, 
in nation-states with a more ethnically mixed population the presence of civic 
components will be stronger, because of the need to maintain a stable politi-
cal order (notwithstanding periods of internal or international political crises, 
frequently marked by inter-ethnic conflicts when ascriptive and cultural com-
ponents of identity most often come to the fore). In addition, modern times are 
characterized by significant population migration, which in EU countries has a 
twofold character: the free movement of people from less developed to more de-
veloped member-countries, and an influx of pauperized people from low-income 
countries. Since our research took place during a period of economic crisis, when 
migrants (especially those of the second type, who are as a rule manifestly dif-
ferent from a cultural perspective from the domicile population) are treated as 
‘scapegoats’ (i.e. blamed as agents who generate the crisis), the proportion of 
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immigrants in a country is taken as an indicator.4 We expect that a higher per-
centage of immigrants will correlate to the stronger presence of ascriptive and 
cultural components, and a lower presence of civic ones.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our analysis rests upon data collected in 17 European countries in the frame of 
the INTUNE project (Integrated and United: A quest for Citizenship in an ‘ever 
closer Europe’). The project was designed to analyse the changes in the scope, 
nature and characteristics of citizenship resulting from the deepening and enlarge-
ment of the European Union (http://www.intune.it/).5 Quantitative research was 
conducted in two waves (2007 and 2009) on two different types of samples: one 
comprising the members of political, economic and media elites, and the other a 
representative national population sample. In this analysis we use the data gathered 
from the second wave of research on the general population for all seventeen sur-
veyed countries (the total sample numbered 16 613 respondents; Table 1).
Table 1: The structure of the sample
Country Sample size Country Sample size
Belgium 1001 UK 1000
Denmark 1002 Estonia 1000
Germany 1000 Hungary 1000
Greece 1000 Poland 1000
Spain 1000 Slovakia 1044
France 1004 Slovenia 1028
Italy 1002 Bulgaria 1007
Portugal 1002 Serbia 1020
Austria 503 Total 16613
4  It should also be mentioned that data collection occurred before the massive influx of migrants 
from war-torn near and Middle-Eastern countries, which drastically changed the perceptions of a 
significant part of the ‘domicile’ population toward ethnically different people. Since data analyses 
show that even before these developments the proportions of migrants significantly influenced the 
characteristics of national identity, we decided to introduce this indicator: even if it points to some 
relatively short-term processes, while we try to understand the long-term factors shaping ethnic 
identities its consequences seem to be potentially too big and lasting to be left out of this paper.
5  The project involved scholars from different scientific fields: political science, sociology, linguistics, 
social psychology, and media. Its main focus was determining how integration and decentralization 
processes, at both national and European levels, affect three major dimensions of citizenship: identity, 
representation, and scope of governance. See more in Sanders, Magalhaes and Toka, 2012; Best, 
Lengyel and Verzichelli, 2012; Bellucci, Sanders, Toka and Torcal, 2012; Bayley and Williams, 2012.
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Elements which comprise components of identity were operationalized in the 
following way (for survey questions and correlation matrix, see Table 2): a. cul-
tural components included the importance of (Christian) religion, shared cultural 
traditions and national feeling as the basis for national identification (items num-
ber 1, 2 and 6 in Table 2); b. ascriptive components were related to the country 
of origin and nationality of parents (items number 3 and 4 in Table 2); while c. 
civic components were marked by respect for national laws and institutions, mas-
tery of the national language6 and political involvement through participation in 
national elections (items number 5, 7 and 8 in Table 2).  Respondents ranked the 
importance of components of different identity bases on a scale of 1-4, where 1 
denoted that the component was not important at all, and 4 that it was very im-
portant. For each of the following components we constructed scales that reflect 
our theoretical concept of instrument-building.7 Although confirmatory factor 
analysis verified that only one factor can be extracted for each of the examined 
components,8 it should be stressed that the aim of this analysis was not to test the 
measurement instrument itself (dealing with complex cross-national compari-
sons usually requires rigorous instrument testing in terms of measurement equiv-
alence; i.e. configural, metric and scalar invariance).9 Our goal was different: to 
operationalize a theoretical model and see whether we could use it as a tool for 
making conclusions about the supposedly changing nature of national identity in 
the present (ever-globalizing) world.
6  This indicator was originally introduced in the survey to represent one of the cultural compo-
nents. However, the wording in the questionnaire implied that it represented a skill which might 
be learned and acquired afterwards, and was not necessarily connected with ethnic origin as the 
mother tongue. Since the factor analysis also showed that this item was related to other civic com-
ponents, not with cultural ones, we included it among the former.
7  Using the same set of items (ISSP 2003 survey), Helbling, Reeskens and Wright constructed a some-
what different measurement instrument (scales of ethnic and civic components of national identity), 
following the results of exploratory factor analysis (Helbling, Reeskens and Wright, 2013). However, 
when applying the bottom-up approach in constructing the measurement instrument, as the authors 
did, one ends up with scales that only partially correspond to theoretical or even common-sense con-
cepts (for example, the importance of citizenship ended up as part of the ethnic component). In con-
structing our instruments, we relied on Shabad and Slomczynski’s concept (introduced in texts that 
deal with the same set of questions for the Polish sample), which argues that those three components 
make up a cognitive dimension of  national identity (as opposed to its emotional dimension), and are 
related to one another to  varying degrees (Shabad and Slomczynski, 2010). 
8  Eigenvalues on the CFA (Maximum Likelihood) for the components of national identity were the 
following: 1.654 (55.128% of variance explained) for the cultural component, 1.655 (82.763% 
of variance explained) for the ascriptive and 1.479 (49.310% of variance explained) for the civic 
component.
9  For more on the problem of measurement equality in examining national identity in cross-national 
surveys, see Davidov, 2009.
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Table 2: Correlation matrix of components of national identity
People differ 
in the way they 
think about what 
it is important to 
be (nationality). 
How important 
for you are each 
of the following 
components 
(nationality)?
1. To be a 
Christian
2. To share 
(nationality) 
cultural 
traditions
3. To be 
born in (our 
country)
4. To have 
(nationality) 
parents
5. To 
respect 
(nationality) 
laws and 
institutions
6. To feel 
(nationality)
7. To master 
(country 
language)
8. To 
exercise 
citizens  
rights
To be a Christian 1 .332** .382** .413** .089** .227** .143** .144**
To share 
(nationality) 
cultural 
traditions
.332** 1 .341** .349** .298** .422** .289** .216**
To be born in 
(our country)
.382** .341** 1 .660** .178** .386** .247** .151**
To have 
(nationality) 
parents
.413** .349** .660** 1 .154** .402** .238** .119**
To respect 
(nationality) 
laws and 
institutions
.089** .298** .178** .154** 1 .320** .296** .247**
To feel 
(nationality)
.227** .422** .386** .402** .320** 1 .288** .158**
To master 
(country 
language)
.143** .289** .247** .238** .296** .288** 1 .179**
To exercise 
citizens’ rights
.144** .216** .151** .119** .247** .158** .179** 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
As was already mentioned, economic modernization was measured through two 
dimensions: economic development, represented by GDP per capita,10 and urban 
development, represented by the level of urbanization.11 For an indicator of political 
10  We are aware that GDP is a very rough and sometimes poor indicator of economic development (in 
comparison with, e.g., the concept of Human Development - see Sen, 1999, and Sen, Dreze, and Fi-
toussi, 2010), but believe that it may serve as its general approximation in our case. Data about GDP 
per capita (in US$) for 2009 are taken from the website: ‘GDP per capita (in US $)’, World Bank, 
available via http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD, accessed in November 2014.
11  ‘Urban population (% of total)’, World Bank, available via http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS, accessed in November 2014.
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modernization we chose the duration of a democratic regime, which is operational-
ized by the division of countries into three categories, depending on the continuity 
of their democratic political regimes during the 20th century: 1. continuously dem-
ocratic: Belgium, Denmark, France, United Kingdom; 2. mostly democratic (over 
fifty years of democratic regimes): Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy; and 3. most-
ly undemocratic (less than fifty years of democratic regimes): Bulgaria, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Spain, Portugal and Serbia. 
Cultural modernization was measured by three indicators, the first and the 
simplest one being the percentage of the population with a university degree 
in a country.12 The second contextual indicator of cultural modernization was 
represented by the importance of religious practices measured as the frequency 
of church attendance (once a week or more frequently).13 Finally, the third indi-
cator was the dominant religious denomination, operationalized by the majority 
presence (as a percentage) of members of different churches: Catholic (Italy, Po-
land, Spain, Portugal, France, Belgium, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia), Orthodox 
(Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria), and Protestant (Denmark, GB, Estonia). Since no one 
denomination was prevalent in Germany and Slovakia, these two countries form 
a separate group of ‘mixed denomination’. 
Apart from the factors representing three dimensions of overall modernization 
processes, we assumed that the influence of two other structural factors related 
to contemporary development should also be checked: ethnic composition of the 
population and migration rates. Ethnic composition is operationalized as the level 
of ethnic homogeneity; i.e. by the percentage of members of the dominant ethnic 
group in the total population of researched countries,14 while the rate of migration 
is operationalized as the percentage of the total population not born in a country.15
12  Data on the percentage of people aged 15-64 with university education (in 2009) are taken from: 
‘Tertiary education statistic’, EUROSTATA, available via http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_ex-
plained/index.php/Tertiary_education_statistics, accessed in November 2014. However, since there 
were no data available for 2009 for Serbia, we used data for 2011 (‘2011 Census of Population, House-
holds and Dwellings in the Republic of Serbia. Book 3: Educational Attainment, Literacy and Com-
puter Literacy’, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, available via http://media.popis2011.stat.
rs/2012/publikacije/Saopstenje31januarKnjiga3_2__engl%20_2_.pdf, accessed in November 2014).
13  Rates of church attendance represent estimates for the year 2008, obtained through representative 
national samples within the European Social Survey (http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/, ac-
cessed in March 2015). Exceptions are the rates for Austria (data were collected in 2006, within 
ESS), Serbia and Italy (data for those two countries were obtained in 2005 from the World Value 
Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurve.org/WVSOnline.jsp, accessed in March 2015).
14  Data are taken from ‘The World Fact Book’, Central Intelligence Agency, available via www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos, accessed in November 2014.
15  Data are taken from ‘World Population Policies 2005’, United Nations, available via http://www.
un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/WPP2005/WPP2005_full.pdf, 
accessed in November 2014.
37
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2016)
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPONENTS OF NATIONAL 
IDENTITY
Our analysis starts with a descriptive overview of the survey data along the 
distribution of three components of national identities – cultural, ascriptive and 
civic – among the population of seventeen European countries.
The means for each of the components for all countries (the theoretical mean is 
2.50) show that most importance (almost equal) is awarded to two components of 
civic identity: mastery of a country’s language (3.66), and respect for the laws and 
institutions (3.5). Interestingly, the only component valued below the theoretical 
mean (therefore disregarded as unimportant) was cultural: religion (mean: 2.47; 
these findings indicate that Brubaker’s thesis about the increasing importance of 
religion in comparison with language as a source of cultural difference in contem-
porary Western societies needs stronger validation – see Brubaker, 2013). Finally, 
ascriptive components (nationality of parents, country of origin) scored the lowest 
after religion (both were awarded 2.99), which means that they were considered 
less important than civic and also other cultural components, but were still posi-
tively valued. Accordingly, our general analytical starting point is confirmed by re-
search data: all three components of national identity are present in all researched 
countries, but to varying extents; in other words, identity may still be considered 
hybrid, but certain components which are characteristic of the demotic type of 
identity (especially ascriptive ones) are valued less highly than others.
THE JOINT EFFECT OF DETERMINANTS  
OF NATIONAL IDENTITY COMPONENTS 
(MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS) 
Checking the next hypotheses, however, was much more complicated. As al-
ready indicated, we attempted to show first that the modernization process has 
been conducive to the strengthening of civic components of national identity 
(and has possibly led to a decrease in the presence of at least some ascriptive 
and cultural components). As already mentioned, all the factors related to the 
influence on characteristics of national identity usually do not have isolated or 
independent effects, but are mainly interdependent (each variable may therefore 
impact another positively or negatively). In order to test for the individual ef-
fects of different individual and contextual factors on components of national 
identity (controlling for the effects of all other variables in the models) we ran 
hierarchical linear regression models (where individual respondents represent 
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the first level of the analysis, and the examined countries the second). The null 
(empty) model for each of the components indicates the amount of variance at 
the second (country) level of analysis, allowing us to decide whether to conduct a 
multilevel analysis. As shown in Tables 3-5, the indicator of ‘level two’ variance, 
Intra Class Correlation (ICC) is highest for cultural and lowest for civic compo-
nents (0.05), which agrees with our previous finding about the low variance of 
civic components at the level of individual respondents.16 On the other hand, the 
relatively high ICC was found for cultural components (0.13) testified that 13 per 
cent of the total variation for that variable should be attributed to non-individual 
(contextual) factors. The percentage of contextual variation for ascriptive com-
ponents lies somewhere between the previous two, amounting to 9 per cent.
The multilevel analysis is displayed for the different models for each of the 
examined national identity components as dependent variables on the one hand, 
and indicators of the examined modernization processes (economic, political or 
cultural) as contextual-level determinants, together with gender, education and 
age, as individual-level independent variables, on the other.
Table 3: Multilevel unstandardized coefficient b’s for the cultural component of nation-
al identity as a dependent variable
Null model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Individual 
level 
variables
-0.28 (0.000)
0.80 (0.000)
-0.43(0.000)
-0.28 (0.000)
0.80 (0.000)
-0.43(0.000)
-0.28 (0.000)
0.80 (0.000)
-0.43(0.000)
-0.28 (0.000)
0.80 (0.000)
-0.43(0.000)
-0.28 (0.000)
0.80 (0.000)
-0.43(0.000)
-0.28 (0.000)
0.80 (0.000)
-0.43(0.000)
-0.28 (0.000)
0.80 (0.000)
-0.43(0.000)
-0.28 (0.000)
0.80 (0.000)
-0.43(0.000)
-0.28 (0.000)
0.80 (0.000)
-0.43(0.000)
-0.28 (0.000)
0.80 (0.000)
-0.43(0.000)
Females
Age (dummy 
for older than 
55 years)
Education 
(dummy for 
university 
degree)
Contextual 
level 
variables
0.43 (0.267)
1.53 (0.001)
0.34 (0.458)
0.46 (0.154)
1.22 (0.002)
0.48 (0.203)
0.61 (0.000)
1.42 (0.000)
1.28 (0.000)
Dominant 
denomination 
(religiously 
mixed 
countries 
as referent 
category):
     Catholic
     Orthodox
     Protestant
16  Such a low level of ICC for civic components represents a borderline value when deciding wheth-
er to conduct a multilevel analysis.
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Democratic 
tradition 
(mostly 
undemocratic 
as referent 
category):
    Constantly 
democratic
     Mostly 
democratic
-0.86 (0.016)
-0.17 (0.627)
GDP per 
capita
-0.00003  
(0.000)
-0.00002 
(0.013)
-0.00002 
(0.005)
Migration 
rate -0.09 (0.010)
Tertiary 
education 
attainment
-0.07 (0.000) -0.05 (0.012) -0.09 (0.000)
Urbanization 
rate -0.03 (0.001)
Intercept
9.34 
(0.000)
9.28 (0.000) 10.11 (0.000) 9.52 (0.000) 10.73 (0.000) 11.70 (0.000) 8.72 (0.000) 9.93 (0.000) 10.85 (0.000) 9.33 (0.000) 10.25 (0.000)
 Variance 
component 0.50 0.46 0.27 0.34 0.27 0.29 0.24 0.33 0.20 0.16 0.07
Variance 
component 3.35 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14
LR test
2278.73 
(0.000)
2237.00 
(0.000)
1309.95 
(0.000) 
1675.09 
(0.000)
1270.32 
(0.000)
1406.58 
(0.000)
1173.47 
(0.000)
1624.91 
(0.000)
955.27 
(0.000)
790.07 
(0.000)
293.84 
(0.000)
ICC 0.13
 
individual 
level
0.000 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
 
contextual 
level
0.000 0.08 0.46 0.32 0.46 0.42 0.52 0.34 0.60 0.68 0.86
N of 
respondents 16613 16613 16613 16613 16613 16613 16613 16613 16613 16613 16613
N of groups 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
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Table 4: Multilevel unstandardized coefficient b’s for the ascriptive component of 
national identity as dependent variable
Null 
model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Individual 
level 
variables
-0.09 (0.001)
0.58 (0.000)
-0.64(0.000)
-0.09 (0.001)
0.58 (0.000)
-0.64(0.000)
-0.09 (0.001)
0.58 (0.000)
-0.64(0.000)
-0.09 (0.001)
0.58 (0.000)
-0.64(0.000)
-0.09 (0.001)
0.58 (0.000)
-0.64(0.000)
-0.09 (0.001)
0.58 (0.000)
-0.64(0.000)
-0.09 (0.001)
0.58 (0.000)
-0.64(0.000)
-0.09 (0.001)
0.58 (0.000)
-0.64(0.000)
-0.09 (0.001)
0.58 (0.000)
-0.64(0.000)
Females
Age dummy 
(older than 55 
years)
Education 
dummy 
(university 
degree)
Contextual 
level 
variables
0.33 (0.336)
0.93 (0.018)
0.04 (0.910)
0.35 (0.156)
0.60 (0.047)
0.20 (0.504)
Dominant 
denomination 
(religiously 
mixed 
countries 
as referent 
category):
     Catholic
     Orthodox
     Protestant
Democratic 
tradition 
(mostly 
undemocratic 
as referent 
category):
    Constantly 
democratic
     Mostly 
democratic
-0.88 (0.000)
-0.39 (0.094)
GDP per 
capita
-0.00003 
(0.000)
-0.00002 
(0.000)
-0.00002 
(0.000)
Migration 
rate
-0.08 (0.000)
Tertiary 
education 
attainment
-0.05 (0.004) -0.03 (0.072)
Urbanization 
rate -0.02 (0.005)
Intercept
5.96 
(0.000)
5.95 (0.000) 6.68 (0.000) 6.25 (0.000) 6.95 (0.000) 7.65 (0.000) 5.61 (0.000) 6.52 (0.000) 7.07 (0.000) 6.25 (0.000)
 Variance 
component 0.31 0.27 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.10 0.10
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Variance 
component 3.11 2.95 2.95 2.95 2.95 2.95 2.95 2.95 2.95 2.95
LR test
1528.67 
(0.000)
1397.82 
(0.000)
637.21 
(0.000)
757.03 
(0.000)
887.46 
(0.000)
943.60 
(0.000)
925.69 
(0.000)
918.89 
(0.000)
529.99 
(0.000)
497.55 
(0.000)
ICC 0.09
 
individual 
level
0.00 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
 
contextual 
level
0.00 0.13 0.63 0.52 0.42 0.39 0.42 0.42 0.80 0.68
N of 
respondents 16613 16613 16613 16613 16613 16613 16613 16613 16613 16613
N of groups 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Table 5: Multilevel unstandardized coefficient b’s for the civic component of national 
identity as dependent variable
Null model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Individual level variables
-0.12 (0.000)
0.33 (0.000)
          
-.007(0.804)
-0.12 (0.000)
0.33 (0.000)
-.006 (0.814)
-0.12 (0.000)
0.33 (0.000)
-.006 (0.814)
-0.12 (0.000)
0.33 (0.000)
-.007 (0.804)
Females
Age dummy (older than 55 years)
Education dummy (university degree)
Contextual level variables 0.0000005 
(0.361)
0.00005 
(0.002)GDP per capita
Tertiary education attainment 0.008 (0.549) 0.06 (0.006)
Interaction  GDP pc and  tertiary 
education att.
-0.0000002 
(0.003)
Intercept 10.39 (0.000) 10.32 (0.000) 10.18 (0.000) 10.16 (0.000) 8.95 (0.000)
 Variance component 
0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.07
Variance component
2.14 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.11
LR test
819.52
(0.000)
772.41
(0.000)
737.61
(0.000)
754.42
(0.000)
441.46
(0.000)
ICC 0.05
 individual level 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
 contextual level
0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.36
N of respondents 16613 16613 16613 16613 16613
N of groups 17 17 17 17 17
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Individual-level variables
Individual variables – gender, age and education – in all constructed models 
(Tables 3-5) proved to be statistically significant predictors of the examined national 
identity components, with an unexpected truancy of connection between the 
education of respondents (represented by a dummy variable for university degree) 
and civic components (Table 5).17 Accordingly, with respect to gender it appears 
that, compared to men, women are less likely to consider all three components 
important, revealing their stronger inclination to distance themselves from all 
forms of national identification. Thus, the strength of this relationship remained 
unchanged when contextual factors were introduced in the models, as was also 
the case with the strength of the effect of the other two individual-level predictors. 
The impact of age18 contrasts with that of gender. Acceptance of all of the 
examined components of national identity rises with respondent age. Essentially, 
this could be a consequence of either changes in socio-psychological characteristics 
related to biological processes (greater closure towards the world as a result of 
advancing age, etc.), or of the lower level of socialization exposure to (some) 
modernization processes. Moreover, this finding could be taken as testament to the 
general cultural changes that have occurred during the last decades (globalization, 
European integration, etc.) which have decreased the importance of national 
identification, and to which younger generations are more exposed. 
University education is significantly negatively related to the acceptance 
of cultural and ascriptive components, and completely unrelated to the civic 
components of national identity. Following the previous interpretation matrix, we 
may conclude that national identification, in general, is dropping in importance for 
a growing number of highly educated people in Europe.
Contextual level variables
Further to the individual traits of the respondents, we also examined the 
effect of contextual variables on components of national identity. The models 
were built by introducing different modernization indicators as contextual-level 
independent variables. The effects of contextual factors on cultural and ascriptive 
17  However, it should be noted that the small number of individual-level predictors that were avail-
able led to relatively poor values of R squared and therefore to low percentages of explained 
variances for individual-level models: 6% on cultural components, 5% on ascriptive and only 1% 
on civic components.
18 Represented by dummy variable for respondents over 55 years old.
43
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2016)
components of national identity proved to be somewhat similar (as expected!), 
as opposed to civic components. However, we here present only those models 
that show statistically significant effects of the examined contextual factors on 
the components of national identity. Therefore, the final models for each of the 
components will inevitably differ. 
The first set of models (Table 3), referring to the contextual determinants of cultural 
components, shows that basic modernization factors do have the hypothesized effects 
in terms of their direction, although at a relatively uneven level of intensity. In Model 
2, for example, the economic development indicator (GDP per capita), as expected, 
proves to be a statistically significant negative predictor of cultural components 
(a higher level of economic development goes hand in hand with a decrease in 
the importance awarded to cultural traits), and the same goes for its effect on the 
ascriptive component (Table 4, Model 2). Political modernization, represented by the 
stability of a democratic regime, also proved to be a statistically significant predictor 
of both the cultural and ascriptive traits of national identity (Tables 3 and 4, Model 
3), indicating that the extent of acceptance of these two components decreases as 
democratic stability grows. Finally, the factor representing cultural development 
(attainment of tertiary education) also proves to be a significant predictor of cultural 
and ascriptive components (again, the higher the level of cultural modernization, the 
lower the scores on two scales; see Model 4 in Tables 3 and 4).
Other modernization indicators mentioned above also had statistically 
significant effects on the extent of acceptance of the cultural and ascriptive 
components of national identity as sole contextual predictors in multilevel 
regression models. Higher levels of urbanization negatively influence the 
prevalence of cultural and ascriptive components (Model 5 in Tables 3 and 4), 
while data related to religious denominations show that compared with religiously 
mixed communities, respondents in predominantly Orthodox countries tend to 
more strongly support ascriptive and cultural traits (Model 6 in Tables 3 and 
4). On the other hand, the third indicator of cultural modernization – church 
attendance rates – in contrast to our hypothesis proved to be a statistically 
insignificant predictor of any of the examined components of national identity 
(and therefore is not shown in the tables). Finally, the effect of rates of migration 
is also in tune with our hypothesis: the higher the level of migration, the lower 
the importance given to ascriptive and cultural components becomes (Model 7 
in Tables 3 and 4).
Besides establishing the individual effects of the analyzed contextual predictors 
of national identity components, our goal was to determine whether they tend to 
change when controlling for the effect of other contextual variables. However, due 
to space limitations, we here present only the models for which the causal effect 
of the examined predictors was statistically significant. In terms of the models 
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which represent the contextual predictors of cultural components, it is clear that 
the effect of tertiary education attainment remains significant (and only slightly 
changed) when controlling for the effect of GDP per capita (Model 8 in Table 
3). The same goes for the effect of religious denomination when controlling for 
the effect of GDP per capita (Model 9 in Table 3). As for models representing 
the predictors of ascriptive components, the effect of religious denomination 
(controlling for the effect of GDP per capita ) slightly decreases, although it remains 
statistically significant (Model 9 in Table 4), while the effect of tertiary education 
attainment (also when controlling for the economic development indicator) loses 
its significance and predictive value (Model 8, Table 4). Furthermore, going back 
to cultural components, the model that proved to be the best in terms of the share 
of contextual variance explained (see the R square values) is that which contained 
dummy variables for religious denomination and the percentage of highly 
educated population as contextual predictors (Model 10 in Table 3). Namely, when 
controlling for the effect of the attainment of a tertiary education, the effect of 
all three denominations – Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic – compared with 
religiously mixed communities as the referent variable, now gains importance, 
increasing the inclination to accept national identity cultural components. Although 
the rate of church attendance did not prove to be a statistically significant sole 
predictor of any of the three components, when controlling for the effect of the 
dominant denomination, its effect gains importance in predicting the acceptance 
of cultural and ascriptive components in such a way that a higher incidence of 
traditional religious practice (regardless of the dominant denomination) correlates 
with stronger acceptance of cultural and ascriptive traits of national identity (with 
no effect whatsoever on the acceptance of civic components).19
However, in multilevel regression models that represent the contextual 
predictors of civic components, not one of the independent variables at the second 
level of analysis was of statistical significance (although the directions of the 
relationships were as expected). Nevertheless, when introducing the interaction 
effect between GDP per capita and tertiary education attainment rate in the 
model, those two predictors, as well as their interaction, became statistically 
significant covariates of civic components: the higher the level of economic 
modernization (when controlling for the effect of cultural modernization and 
their interaction effect) the greater the acceptance of civic components of national 
identity (model 4 in Table 5). The negative value of unstandardized coefficient b 
19  In a multilevel regression model, when controlling for age, education and gender as level one 
predictors, and dummy variables for Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox denomination as level two 
predictors, the effect of the rate of church attendance on cultural and ascriptive components is sig-
nificant and positive (with a coefficient b of 0.03 for cultural and 0.02 for ascriptive components 
as dependent variables).
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for the interaction effect, however, suggests the following conclusion: the higher 
the level of economic development of the country, the more the effect of tertiary 
education attainment on the acceptance of civic components decreases. 
In short, the initial insights into all presented models allows the preliminary 
conclusion that the effects of the examined contextual factors on the components 
of national identity (when controlling for the effects of other assumed predictors) 
are in accordance with their individual influence in the case of cultural and 
ascriptive components, but differ with respect to civic components.
If we choose to interpret the multilevel analysis from another angle – by 
including the modernization indicators – it seems that, in the case of cultural 
and ascriptive components, almost all the analysed indicators of modernization 
(in the three subsystems) prove to be statistically significant predictors, as 
indicated in our hypothetical framework: growing modernization is leading 
to a decrease in the importance of both cultural and ascriptive components 
of national identity. However, in the case of civic components our hypotheses 
were only partially confirmed: the expected direction of the relationship was 
confirmed for indicators representing economic (GDP per capita) and cultural 
development (tertiary education attainment), but only when controlling for their 
interaction. This finding leads us to a potentially unexpected conclusion: the 
relationship between cultural and ascriptive components of national identity, 
on the one hand, and civic components on the other, is far from oppositional, 
but is rather relatively neutral. An increase in the level of acceptance of civic 
components does not necessarily lead to a drop in the level of acceptance of the 
other two components, since the latter is determined by other factors that need to 
be analysed further (a clue to the potential direction of further analysis is given 
by the findings about individual-level predictors: a higher level of education 
appears to be related to decreases in the importance of this – national – form of 
collective identity in general). On the other hand, when controlling for the effect 
of economic development, this particular element of modernization apparently 
gains in importance with the growing acceptance of civic components. However, 
we should again underline the fact that the positive effect of tertiary education 
attainment on civic components may be registered only up to a certain level of 
economic development, after which it tends to decrease. In a few words, it seems 
that modernization, represented here in its basic aspects, almost inevitably leads 
to the diminishment of the importance of ethnic identification in its cultural and 
ascriptive aspects, as well as to dual processes relevant for civic identity: the 
strengthening, or alternatively, weakening, of all forms of collective identity.
 In brief, it seems that this attempt at the analysis of a synthesis of a wide set 
of factors which determine the extent of the acceptance of the national identity 
components under examination simultaneously questions, as well as informs, 
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our hypotheses and conclusions. Needless to say, these findings can hardly be 
regarded as unexpected, keeping in mind the complex nature of the identity-
formation process, the multitude of individual and social factors this process 
involves, the complexity of these factors, and the fact that some of the examined 
causal agents may produce contradictory effects on the components of national 
identity (let us recall that the break with the socialist regime in Eastern Europe 
simultaneously increased the tendency towards the strengthening of national 
sovereignty and nationalism, and the transfer of a substantial part thereof to the 
EU).
CONCLUSIONS
Having analyzed the survey data, what may we finally conclude about 
the relationships between processes of modernization and national identity 
characteristics? Another look at our data shows that the ‘hardest’ and the simplest 
indicator of modernization proved to be the best predictor: the level of economic 
development, represented by GDP per capita is significantly positively correlated 
to the spread of the civic components of national identity (Model 4, Table 5), 
and negatively with the spread of cultural and ascriptive components (Models 
2, 8 and 9 in Tables 3 and 4). Naturally, the strength of the relationship in some 
models has been reduced by its overlap with other factors, but the basic hypothesis 
that guided our analysis – about the deterministic influence of modernization on 
decreasing the spread of ascriptive and of cultural components – is supported by 
the most important, economic, dimension. On the other hand, the effect of the 
same factor on civic components is rather ambiguous: in some cases it increases 
their significance, and in others reduces it (as a rule, the negative effect of GDP 
per capita on civic components goes hand in hand with its similar effect on the 
other two components – cultural and ascriptive). An individual-level variable 
– the dummy variable for university education – testifies to the same, since it 
decreases the importance of ascriptive and cultural components, even if it is not 
significant for the spread of civic ones. Finally, findings about the influence of the 
share of migrants in the population are very indicative, since this indicator proves 
to be significantly correlated to the lower level of acceptance of the ascriptive 
and cultural components of identity, precisely in the framework wherein these 
components are basically defined (ethnic ‘purity’).
These findings and the preceding analysis of the isolated effects of individual 
factors together much more strongly support our hypotheses. At the very 
beginning of the analysis we firstly saw that the components of civic identity as 
a whole were rated higher than others, and have the lowest level of individual 
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and contextual variation. Secondly, almost all the indicators for modernization 
we used were related to identity components in the way we hypothesized (so 
that a higher level of modernization stimulates the spread of civic components 
and hinders appreciation of the ascriptive and cultural components), with the 
following limitation: most of these factors have a strong influence up to a 
certain developmental level, after which their influence decreases. In short, our 
empirical evidence suggests that the advancement of the modernization process 
changes the characteristics of national identity by increasing the importance of 
its civic components which are necessary for the functioning of an ever-more 
interdependent world. However, this does not mean that other components 
disappear; in our analysis we only witnessed their partial withdrawal, parallel 
with a (potential) total decline in the importance of all forms of national identity.
 It is also clear that our last conclusion may be formulated from a different 
perspective: even if modernization is creating the conditions for the spread 
of the civic components of national identity, obstacles to this expansion arise 
at a certain point of development and support for the existence of substantive 
components remains, securing the survival of ‘natural’ borders between ethnic 
groups (evidenced by the growing ethnic nationalism in numerous EU countries 
over the last few years). This contradictory movement of spread/survival is 
the result of the extremely complex effects of numerous factors which act in 
different directions so that their outcome in specific social surroundings cannot 
be simply predicted. National identities, therefore, retain their hybrid nature, 
notwithstanding changes in the proportions of their components, which still 
makes the character of interethnic relations within and between nation-states an 
open question.
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